

The broad outlines of these post-Gideon changes are familiar to legal scholars.

This Article describes these changes primarily through the example of Massachusetts, while contextualizing that example with national comparisons. By 1973, this new consensus had transformed criminal practice nationwide through the establishment of hundreds of public defender offices and the expansion of lawyers’ presence in low-level criminal proceedings. Gideon shifted the legal profession’s policy consensus on indigent defense away from a charity model toward a public model. For criminal procedure scholars, advocates, and journalists, Gideon has failed, in practice, to guarantee meaningful legal help for poor people charged with crimes.ĭrawing on original historical research, this Article instead chronicles what Gideon did - the doctrinal and institutional changes it inspired between 1963 and the early 1970s. For constitutional theorists, Gideon imposed a preexisting national consensus upon a few “outlier” states, and therefore did not represent a dramatic doctrinal shift.

Wainwright’s legacy focus on what Gideon did not do - its doctrinal and practical limits.
